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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3681 
___________ 
 
DEAN ST. AUBYN HARVEY, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
               Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A041-351-457) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret Reichenberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 16, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 17, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Dean St. Aubyn Harvey petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the 
following reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion to dismiss the petition for lack 
of jurisdiction.   
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 Harvey, a native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States around April 
1987 as a lawful permanent resident.  In November 1990, he was convicted in New York 
State Court of criminal possession of stolen property, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law  
§ 165.45, and criminal possession of a weapon, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02.  
In March 1997, Harvey was convicted in New York State Court of criminal 
impersonation, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 190.25.  Most recently, in February 
2012, he was convicted of assault in the third degree, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law  
§ 120.00. 
 The Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging him 
with removability as an aggravated felon (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), and as a two-
time offender of crimes involving moral turpitude (id at. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)).  In a May 
2012 decision, the IJ sustained both charges.  Specifically, she determined that Harvey is 
removable as an aggravated felon as a result of his 1990 theft conviction, and that he is 
removable for having committed crimes involving moral turpitude because of his 1990 
theft conviction and his 2012 assault conviction.  The IJ then denied Harvey’s request for 
a waiver of removal under former INA § 212(c).  She concluded that, even if his three 
earlier convictions could be waived, Harvey is ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver because he 
became removable on the ground of having two convictions for crimes of moral turpitude 
upon his conviction for third degree assault, which occurred after the effective date of 
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AEDPA and IIRIRA (April 1, 1997).
1
  See Rodriguez-Munoz v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245, 
248 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “[t]he grant of a section 212(c) relief merely waives the 
finding of deportability rather than the basis of the deportability itself.  Therefore, the 
crimes alleged to be grounds for deportability do not disappear from the alien’s record for 
immigration purposes.”); see also Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 353 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“[T]he fact that a petitioner’s deportation based on a particular conviction has 
been waived does not prevent subsequent consideration of the same underlying 
conviction for other purposes.”).  The IJ also declined to grant Harvey a continuance to 
“collaterally attack” his convictions. 
 Harvey appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”), 
arguing that he has filed a motion under New York Criminal Procedural Law § 440.10 to 
vacate his convictions on the basis that his guilty pleas are invalid because his criminal 
counsel misrepresented or failed to inform him of their potential immigration 
consequences.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  In an August 2012 
decision, the BIA dismissed Harvey’s appeal, finding that the IJ correctly determined that 
he is ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver.  The BIA also determined that Harvey failed to 
demonstrate that he has actually initiated state post-conviction proceedings and, in any 
event, relief is speculative.  The Board also determined that to the extent Harvey claimed 
that the IJ erred in denying him a continuance because he was not represented by counsel, 
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 The IJ also noted that because Harvey is an aggravated felon, he is ineligible for 
cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a). 
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the claim is meritless because Harvey expressly told the IJ that he wished to proceed on 
his own behalf at the final administrative hearing.  This pro se petition for review 
followed. 
 Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien 
who was adjudged inadmissible for having committed a crime of moral turpitude, or for 
having committed an aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  However, we retain 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to “review the [agency’s] legal 
determinations de novo,” subject to applicable canons of deference.  Santos-Reyes v. 
Att’y Gen., 660 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 
205 (3d Cir. 2011) (exercising review over aggravated felony determination); Mehboob 
v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008) (same, but for moral turpitude offense). 
 In his Informal Brief, Harvey argues that the IJ incorrectly determined that he was 
removable on the basis that his 1990 conviction for criminal possession of stolen property 
qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude, and as an aggravated felony.  Although we 
would retain jurisdiction to review these questions under § 1252(a)(2)(D), we are 
jurisdictionally barred from doing so here because Harvey did not exhaust these issues 
administratively.  Prior to raising an issue for judicial review, a petitioner must exhaust 
all administrative remedies available as of right regarding that issue.  8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(d)(1); Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009).  This is a 
jurisdictional requirement.  See Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 & n.3 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
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 As mentioned, on appeal to the BIA, Harvey argued only that he is pursuing 
collateral relief in state court, and that the IJ erred in denying his request for a 
continuance.
2
  He did not argue that the IJ erred in determining that his state conviction 
for criminal possession of stolen property constituted an aggravated felony and/or a crime 
of moral turpitude and the BIA did not consider those issues sua sponte.  See Lin v. Att’y 
Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2008).  Therefore, the claims have not been 
exhausted and we lack jurisdiction to consider them. 
 Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion and will dismiss the petition for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
                                              
2
 In his Informal Brief, Harvey does not articulate any challenge to the Board’s dismissal 
of his appeal from the IJ’s denial of his continuance request.  As a result, the issue is 
waived.  See Bradley v. Att’y Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 243 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
argument not raised in opening brief is waived). 
 
